CIPHER BRIEF EXPERT VIEW — Much debate is now underway about whether Russian president Vladimir Putin will sustain lasting political damage from the June 24 revolt led by Wagner mercenary chief Yevgeny Prigozhin.
Some analysts cautiously hint that Putin is hurt badly, many say not much, and most say it’s just too soon to tell.
To be sure, there is much we don’t know, and predicting anything in Russia is perilous business — but my long-held view is that the war from the very beginning, unleashed trends likely to loosen Putin’s grip on power. Exactly how, when and whether this happens, will be affected by many things including fortunes in the war, the condition of the Russian economy, and what support he can maintain from partners such as China. But assuming the continued deterioration that I expect, the key questions are how long it will take and what form it will take over time – an easing out or ouster, a resignation, or perhaps most likely, a weakened and ineffective leader clinging to power in a drained and dispirited nation that lacks both the power and influence it had earlier in Putin’s tenure.
The backdrop of course, is the rebellion launched on June 24 by Prigozhin. The Wagner leader briefly took over Russia’s war command headquarters at Rostov-on-Don and moved his forces to within 120 miles of Moscow. Prigozhin’s message was as important as his actions; he charged that corrupt, ambitious politicians and generals were sending young Russians to die in a war with the false rationale that Ukraine and NATO were threatening Russia.
Prigozhin’s actions threaten Putin’s reputation, authority, and fortunes at three levels: – societal, among elites, and in the Ukraine war.
At the societal level, Prigozhin’s rant unleashed what I came to think of during previous work on authoritarian societies, as a virus of truth. Much of the Russian population may be numbed by endless falsehoods spinning out of Putin’s propaganda machine. But in authoritarian societies, a person of influence saying out loud what many suspect or think but fear to say – that the war makes no sense and has been badly mismanaged — gives tacit permission to others to engage in more candid discussion than the regime permits. Ultimately, fewer people believe. (I saw this happen often in the late 1980s, as Soviet rule began to crumble in Moscow’s East European satellite states).
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This falls on fertile ground. That’s what I took from a conversation I had recently at a conference with a well-informed Russian person (the conference did not permit attribution). This person, fresh from long residency in Russia (and speaking before Prigozhin’s mutiny), estimated that at most, about 25 percent of the population supported the war, about 25 percent opposed it, and the remaining 50 percent understood that the war is wrong — but just didn’t want to think about it. ‘That 50 percent takes refuge in the government’s version without totally buying it’, my contact explained. I think the government’s post-mutiny pro
